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HOW SHOULD SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
BE REGULATED?
I. INTRODUCTION
Before 2007, few had heard of sovereign wealth funds (SWFs). SWFs
became visible during the subprime mortgage housing crisis that began in
summer 2007, during which large U.S.-based financial institutions suffered
huge losses and turned to foreign investors to ease the resulting credit
crunch. In many cases, these investors are state-controlled. 1 According to
an estimate by Morgan Stanley, SWFs invested about $37 billion in U.S.
financial institutions in 2007. 2 Although SWF infusions have alleviated the
credit crunch and played a stabilizing role, SWFs have raised concerns due
to their high-profile deals and increasing sizes. First, SWFs are generally
opaque about investment criteria, management, and financial information,
thus potentially presenting a systematic risk to market security. 3 Second,
because they are controlled by governments, SWFs may not focus on
wealth maximization. 4 Non-commercial considerations may threaten the

1. When Nations Amass Dollars, the Fault Lies in Ourselves, USA TODAY, Jan. 21, 2008, at
10A, available at http://www.usatoday.com/printedition/news/20080121/edit21.art.htm.
2. See Anders Aslund, The Truth About Sovereign Wealth Funds, FOREIGN POLICY, Dec.
2007, http://www.foreignpolicy.com/story/cms.php?story_id=4056; see also China Fund Grabs
Morgan Stanley Stake, THE SIDNEY MORNING HERALD, Dec. 20, 2008, available at
http://business.smh.com.au/china-fund-grabs-morgan-stanley-stake/20071220-1i6p.html (stating
in December 2007, the China Investment Corporation invested $5 billion in Morgan Stanley, soon
after the financial firm announced it was writing off $9.4 billion of loss in mortgage investments);
Citi to Sell $7.5 Billion of Equity Units to the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority, REUTERS, Nov. 26,
2007, http://www.reuters.com/article/mergersNews/idUSN2643967220071127 (discussing that in
November 2007, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority (ADIA), the world’s largest state-owned
fund, purchased a 4.9% stake in Citigroup for $7.5 billion); Marine Cole, Hybrids Let Foreign
Investors Skirt Fed’s 9.9% Wall, FIN. WEEK, Jan. 21, 2008, available at
http://www.financialweek.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080121/REG/9599056/1028;
Thomas Heath, Government of Abu Dhabi Buys Stake in Carlyle, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 21,
2007, § Financial, at D01 (stating in September 2007, Dubai’s Mubadala Development Company
invested $1.35 billion for a 7.5% stake in the Carlyle Group, a private-equity firm); Merrill Lynch
Will
Sell
Stake
to
Temasek
Holdings,
REUTERS,
Dec.
25,
2007,
http://www.cnbc.com/id/22395384/ (Merrill Lynch announced that Singapore’s Temasek would
buy $4.4 billion worth of Merrill stock with an option to buy $600 million more by March 2008);
Yalman Onaran, Citigroup, Merrill Receive $21 Billion from Investors, REUTERS, Jan. 15, 2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=anjGWhqi0PSE&refer=home
(discussing that in January, 2008, sovereign funds from Abu Dhabi, Kuwait, Singapore, and South
Korea provided a $21 billion infusion of capital to Citigroup and Merrill Lynch. The funds owners
were Tokyo-based Mizuho Financial Group Inc., the Korean Investment Corp., the Kuwait
Investment Authority, the Government of Singapore Investment Corp. and Saudi Prince Alwaleed
bin Talal).
3. See generally EDWIN TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD FOR SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS
(Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. 2007) [hereinafter TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD].
4. EDWIN TRUMAN, SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS: THE NEED FOR GREATER TRANSPARENCY
AND ACCOUNTABILITY 4–6 (Peterson Inst. for Int’l Econ. 2007) [hereinafter TRUMAN,
SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUNDS].
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national security of host countries. 5 Given these concerns, there have been
calls for greater scrutiny of SWF activities.
The United States has modified the Foreign Investment and National
Security Act (FINSA) to strengthen interagency review of foreign
investment. 6 France and Germany have avowed that they will not allow
acquisitions from state-controlled investors to take place in their territories. 7
Some economists and policy makers, however, see restrictions on SWFs as
protectionist responses and are concerned about the negative effects of
protectionism. 8 They stress the benefits of foreign capital, such as lowering
interest rates and promoting employment and innovation. 9
There is a delicate balance between the protection of national security
and an open investment policy. This note argues that FINSA, a unilateral
U.S. regulation of foreign investment with an emphasis on SWFs, is
unnecessary and may even be harmful to the U.S. capital markets and
overall economy. In coordination with other countries, especially the
European countries into which SWF capital has increasingly flowed, the
U.S. should instead further its efforts for increased SWF transparency. In
addition, the U.S. should maintain and refine its present regulation of
foreign ownership in sensitive industries such as energy and
telecommunications.
Part II of this note describes the history of SWFs and their current
development. Part III addresses concerns and benefits relating to SWFs.
Part IV reviews U.S. policy and regulation of foreign investment. Part V
argues for the establishment of a set of international guidelines that address
SWF transparency. Part VI concludes by arguing that U.S. efforts to
establish international guidelines for SWF activities will be in line with
U.S. national interests and the open investment policy that the United States
has traditionally advocated.
II. SWFS: DEVELOPMENT AND INVESTMENT APPROACHES
An SWF is a government investment vehicle funded by foreign
exchange assets that are managed separately from a country’s official

5. Id.
6. Ed Mullane & Bhavna Kaul, Sovereign Wealth Funds Could be Impacted by Upcoming

FINSA Regulations, FIN. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2008, available at http://www.ft.com/cms/s/2/d33cd7fcd34b-11dc-b861-0000779fd2ac,dwp_uuid=e8477cc4-c820-11db-b0dc-000b5df10621.html.
7. Carter Dougherty, Europe Looks to Control State-run Investors; Officials are wary of
Intentions of China and Russia, INT’L HERALD TRIB., July 14, 2007, § News, at 1; see also
Sarkozy Attacks Wealth Funds on Eve of Mideast Trip, REUTERS, Jan. 12, 2008,
http://www.reuters.com/article/oilRpt/idUSL1220023020080112.
8. Asset-backed Insecurity, THE ECONOMIST, Jan. 19, 2008, available at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10533428.
9. Id. See also Jonathan C. Stagg, Scrutinizing Foreign Investment: How Much
Congressional Involvement is Too Much, 93 IOWA L. REV. 325, 331 (2007).
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reserves. 10 In addition to high foreign currency exposures, SWFs feature
other key elements, including a high-risk tolerance, long investment
horizons, and a lack of explicit liabilities. 11
Although the term was recently coined, SWFs are by no means a new
phenomenon. The first fund, Kuwait Investment Board, was established in
1953. 12 Early sovereign funds generally had moderate goals. For example,
the Kuwait fund was created as a means to stabilize its economy from
volatile oil prices, 13 and Kiribati’s Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund was
formed in 1956 to manage profits from phosphate mining. 14 However, the
landscape of SWFs has changed. As SWFs have grown rapidly in recent
years, countries’ currency reserve cushions intended for economic
stabilization have exceeded their immediate needs. 15 Accordingly, SWF
owners have begun engaging in riskier, yet potentially higher-yielding,
investments. 16
A. RECENT DEVELOPMENT OF SWFS
The 1970s and 1990s saw the two major waves of SWF formation. In
the 1970s, in response to the oil crisis caused by the Arab oil embargo,
Middle East and American countries established funds to mitigate oil
shock. 17 In the 1990s, more sovereign funds were formed, following
Norway’s Government Pension Fund - Global, which was launched in 1990
to preserve wealth for future generations of Norwegians. 18 This wave
continues today. In the past eight years, funds have been established by
China, Iran, Russia, Qatar, and the United Arab Emirates. 19 In December
2007, Saudi Arabia announced plans to establish an SWF that is likely to be

10. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, REPORT TO CONGRESS ON INT’L ECONOMIC AND EXCHANGE
RATE POLICIES (2007), http://www.treas.gov/offices/international-affairs/economic-exchangerates/.
11. STEPHEN JEN, CURRENCIES: THE DEFINITION OF A SOVEREIGN WEALTH FUND, MORGAN
STANLEY
GLOBAL
RES.
Oct.
25,
2007,
available
at
http://sovereignwealthfunds.files.wordpress.com/2008/01/the-definition-of-a-sovereign-wealthfund-morgan-stanley-october-2007.pdf.
12. See generally Martin Weiss, Sovereign Wealth Funds: Background and Policy Issues, CRS
REPORT FOR CONGRESS (RL34336; Jan. 28, 2008) (discussing how the Kuwait Investment Board
was later acquired by the Kuwait Investment Authority, a separate fund founded in 1960).
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. David J. Lynch, Foreign Governments Seek Higher Returns; Cash-rich Nations’ Secretive
Investment Funds May Hurt Treasuries, Trigger Backlash, USA TODAY, June 21, 2007, § Money,
at 1B.
16. Id.
17. See Gas Fever: Happiness Is a Full Tank, TIME MAG., Feb. 18, 1974. See also TRUMAN,
A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3.
18. Weiss, supra note 12.
19. Id. See also TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3.
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the world’s largest. 20 The proposed Saudi fund would dwarf the world’s
presently largest SWF, the Abu Dhabi Investment Authority and
Corporation (ADIA). 21
Not only have SWFs increased in numbers, their value has grown
rapidly in recent years. The value of Norway’s Government Pension Fund –
Global grew 28% in 2006, resulting in current holdings exceeding $300
billion. 22 The value of the portfolio for Singapore’s Temasek Holdings rose
35% to $108 billion in assets. 23 The Kuwait Investment Authority grew
30% to reach over $200 billion in holdings. 24 The growth rate for Russia’s
Stabilization Fund was 96%. 25 The fund had over $140 billion in assets in
2007. 26 The ADIA has achieved a 20% rate of return for many years and
rarely considers deals less than $100 million. 27 Although China’s $3 billion
investment in the Blackstone Group has lost more than half its value, 28
China’s $1.5 trillion in foreign reserves is growing at a rate of more than
$20 billion a month. 29
The Federal Reserve Bank of New York estimates that SWFs have a
combined $2.5 trillion at their disposal, larger than the combined assets of
all hedge funds and private equity funds. 30 Morgan Stanley projects that
SWFs will grow to $12 trillion by 2015. 31 Funds derived from oil and gas
export revenues constitute approximately two-thirds of the total assets held
by SWFs, with the rest consisting of funds primarily controlled by Asian
surplus exporters. 32 Table 1 provides a list of the major SWFs in the world.

20. Henny Sender & David Wighton, Saudis Plan Huge Sovereign Wealth Fund, FIN. TIMES,
Dec. 21, 2007, available at http://us.ft.com/ftgateway/superpage.ft?news_id=fto1221200
71455059553.
21. Id.
22. See Investments—World Grows More Wary of Sovereign Wealth Funds, ASIAMONEY,
Nov.
28,
2007,
available
at
http://www.asiamoney.com/Article/2055809/Channel/
18816/INVESTMENTS-World-grows-more-wary-of-sovereign-wealth-funds.html
[hereinafter
Investments].
23. Id.
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3.
27. Henny Sender, Live at Apollo (Management): Plan to Cash In, Limit Scrutiny, WALL ST.
J., July 17, 2007 at C1.
28. Michael Flaherty, Sovereign Wealth Funds are Shying Away from Wall Street Firms, INT’L
HERALD TRIB., Mar. 18, 2008, § Finance, at 12.
29. For further detail, see the monthly data on the website of China’s State Administration of
Foreign Exchange (SAFE), http://www.safe.gov.cn.
30. George F. Will, Investors We Need Not Fear, WASHINGTON POST, Feb. 3, 2008, at B07,
available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/02/01/AR200802010
2662.html.
31. Stephen Jen, Currencies: How Big Can Sovereign Wealth Funds be by 2015, MORGAN
STANLEY GLOBAL RES., May 3, 2007. See also Investments, supra note 22 (Gerard Lyons, chief
economist at Standard Chartered, estimates that SWFs will grow six-fold in the next decade, a
potential total of $13.2 trillion).
32. Jen, supra note 31.
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Table 1 33
World’s Largest SWFs

Country

Funds

United Arab
Emirates

Abu Dhabi Investment Authority
and Corporation (ADIA)
Mubadala Development Company
Isithmar
Government Pension Fund – Global
Government of Singapore
Investment Corporation (GIC)
Temasek Holdings
Kuwait Investment Authority
China Investment Corporation, Ltd.
(CIC)
Stabilization Fund for the Russian
Federation
Qatar Investment Authority
Future Fund
Revenue Regulations Fund
Alaska Permanent Fund
Brunei Investment Agency
Korea Investment Corporation
National Oil Fund
Khazanah Nasional
National Development Fund
Macroeconomic Stabilization Fund
Alberta Heritage Savings Trust
Fund
Economic and Social Stabilization
Fund
Superannuation Fund
Oil Stabilization Fund

Norway
Singapore
Kuwait
China
Russia
Qatar
Australia
Algeria
United States
Brunei
Korea
Kazakhstan
Malaysia
Venezuela
Canada
Chile
New Zealand
Iran
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Size ($
billions)
500–875

Year
Established
1976

10
4
329
100–330

2002
2003
1990
1981

108
213
200

1974
1960
2007

141

2004

50
49
43
40
30
20
19
18
15
1
15

2005
2006
2000
1976
1983
2005
2000
1993
2005
1998
1976

10

2006

10
9

2001
2000

B. REASONS FOR SWF GROWTH AND CHANGES IN SWF
INVESTMENT APPROACHES
The recent growth of SWFs can be attributed to several factors. First, it
is a consequence of the rapid increase of commodity prices and large trade
surpluses in emerging markets. 34 The recent commodity price boom has
swelled the asset holdings of commodity-exporting countries. 35 The value
33. TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3. See also Belinda Cao, China’s $200 Billion
Sovereign
Fund
Begins
Operations,
BLOOMBERG,
Sept.
29,
2007,
http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601080&sid=aPeGXnGYN9g4 (last visited Apr. 9,
2009).
34. Weiss, supra note 12.
35. Id.
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of oil and gas exports from the Middle East was about $650 billion in 2007
and is expected to rise in coming years. 36 Worldwide government revenues
from oil and gas are estimated at $510 billion for 2007 and will keep
increasing. 37 Considering these revenues to be temporary, Middle East
countries have avoided using them for domestic expenditures, which may
cause serious economic problems such as inflation. Instead, they have
invested the excess commodity-export income in SWFs. 38 The savings thus
serve as a financial stabilizer if commodity prices decline and depress tax
revenue. 39 Because they serve immediate needs, funds intended for
financial stabilization tend to be conservative in their investment decisions,
focusing on fixed income rather than equity investment. 40
Although many oil funds are predominantly oriented towards
stabilization, as the assets of funds reach a level beyond stabilization needs,
the objective of saving wealth across generations takes priority. 41
Consequently, savings funds are utilized to transform public assets, such as
oil and other natural resources that are subject to fluctuating commodity
prices, into a diversified and conceivably stable global portfolio, thereby
protecting the income stream for future generations. As compared to
stabilization funds, savings funds are characterized as having longer
investment horizons and more aggressive investment strategies. 42 Savings
funds are invested in a broader range of assets, including longer-term
government bonds, agency and asset-backed securities, corporate bonds,
equities, commodities, real estate, derivatives, private equity, hedge funds,
and foreign direct investment. 43
A second factor behind the growth of SWFs is the long-standing trade
surpluses of Asian emerging market countries with the United States and
other Western countries, resulting in huge foreign currency reserves. 44
Following the 1998 Asian financial crisis, many Asian economies began
accumulating large amounts of reserves to provide adequate insurance
against future currency fluctuations. 45 Given the goal of these currency
36. AASIM M. HUSAIN, RIDING THE CREST OF THE OIL BOOM, IMF MIDDLE EAST AND
CENTRAL ASIA DEPARTMENT (Oct. 30, 2007), http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/survey/so/
2007/CAR1030A.htm; see also INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, REGIONAL ECONOMIC
OUTLOOK: MIDDLE EAST AND CENTRAL ASIA, Oct. 2008.
37. Id.
38. Sovereign Wealth Funds: Stumbling Blocks or Stepping Stones to Financial Globalization,
FRBSF ECONOMIC LETTER, Dec. 14, 2007, http://www.frbsf.org/publications/economics/letter/
2007/el2007-38.html.
39. Id.
40. Rachel Ziemba, Responses to Sovereign Wealth Funds: Are ‘Draconian’ Measures on the
Way?, RGE MONITOR, Nov. 2007, available at http://www.rgemonitor.com/economonitormonitor/220669/responses_to_sovereign_wealth_funds_are_draconian_measures_on_the_way.
41. See Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 38.
42. Id.
43. Id.
44. Weiss, supra note 12.
45. See Asset-backed Insecurity, supra note 8.
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reserves, they were invested conservatively. For example, China initially
invested much of its reserves in U.S. government treasury bills, which
offered little risk but low rates of return on the investment. 46 As the foreign
reserves grew beyond Asian countries’ immediate needs, however, their
risk tolerance increased, and the countries holding large reserves began
diversifying portfolios and seeking riskier yet potentially higher-yielding
investments. 47 Finally, in addition to trade surpluses, foreign currency
reserves of countries like China also result from their attempts to limit the
appreciation of their own currency against the dollar. 48
C. SWF GOALS & TRANSPARENCY
SWF owners claim to have different goals for their funds. The CIC was
created to “improve the rate of return on China’s . . . foreign exchange
reserves and to soak up some of the nation’s excess financial liquidity.” 49
The Norwegian government says its fund is an instrument for ensuring that
a reasonable portion of the country’s petroleum wealth benefits future
generations. 50 A country may have multiple SWFs and multiple goals for
the funds. The United Arab Emirates created the ADIA, its primary fund, to
invest surplus cash in assets that provide steady returns over the long run;
its newer fund, Mubadala Development, however, has pursued direct
investment projects targeted at higher returns. 51
SWFs also differ in management and levels of transparency. Norway’s
and Qatar’s funds are directly managed through the central bank or the
finance ministry, while the United Arab Emirate’s funds are incorporated as
private companies with some degree of independence. 52 However, funds’
management structure does not necessarily speak of their transparency
level. The funds of Norway, New Zealand, Alaska, and Canada are highly
transparent in their investment criteria and financial accounting. They
conventionally invest in a wide range of investments, including bonds,

46. Joe McDonald, China to Create Firm to Invest Its $1 Trillion in Reserves, ASSOCIATED
PRESS, Mar. 10, 2007, available at http://www.globalresearch.ca/index.php?context=va&aid=
5039.
47. Lynch, supra note 15.
48. Wayne M. Morrison & Marc Labonte, China’s Currency: Economic Issues and Options
for U.S. Trade Policy, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS (RL32165; Jan. 9, 2008).
49. Michael F. Martin, China’s Sovereign Wealth Funds, CRS REPORT FOR CONGRESS
(RL34337; Jan. 22, 2008).
50. See, e.g., Transparency and Trust: Keys to the Norwegian Pension Fund, Norway the
Official Site in the United States, http://www.norway.org/policy/gpf/norwegian+pension+fund+
global.htm.
51. Weiss, supra note 12, at 7.
52. Jim Hamilton’s World of Securities Regulation, SEC and European Commission Seek
More Transparency for Sovereign Wealth Funds, http://jimhamiltonblog.blogspot.com/search?
q=SEC+and+European+Commission+Seek+More+Transparency+for+Sovereign+Wealth+Funds
(Dec. 25, 2007, 16:15 EST).
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equities, commodities, and foreign direct investment. 53 Malaysia’s SWF
and Singapore’s Temasek Holdings, while also transparent, pursue more
strategic holdings, targeting industries that are of sovereign interest. 54 Funds
controlled by the United Arab Emirates, Qatar, Kuwait, and China are
among those that disclose the least information about their activities and are
most likely to consider sovereign interests in their investing activities. 55
III. SWFS: CONCERNS AND BENEFITS
Because SWFs have become increasingly active as market participants,
they will likely affect financial markets in a systematic manner. SWFs thus
draw attention from financial analysts and policymakers, who have assessed
the benefits and possible detriments of SWFs. This part begins with a list of
concerns about sovereign funds, followed by an evaluation of them. It
concludes by analyzing the benefits that SWFs have brought and will likely
bring to the U.S. and global economies.
A. CONCERNS ABOUT SWF ACTIVITIES
1. Lack of Transparency
SWF transparency can be measured in terms of the level of disclosure
of the following factors: size of the fund, types of investment, earnings,
holders of investment mandates, auditing, geographic location, investment
instruments, and currency composition of investments. 56 Among the funds
that have shown a high level of transparency are the funds of Norway and
New Zealand. 57 In contrast, those owned by the United Arab Emirates,
Qatar, Kuwait, and China are less transparent. 58
SWF transparency is important for a few key reasons. First, limited
disclosure of SWFs makes it difficult to determine whether funds are
pursuing non-commercial interests, which has created fear of SWF
activities. 59 Second, the lack of disclosure also makes it difficult to assess
governance of the funds by obscuring mismanagement and governance
irregularities within the funds. 60 This problem is of particular concern as
many SWFs are established in countries that lack the underpinnings for
good corporate governance. Some policymakers consider that, in these
countries, sizable failures in management and corruption by fund managers
are possible, and that the problem may be worsened because of limited
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

See Sovereign Wealth Funds, supra note 38.
Weiss, supra note 12.
TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Weiss, supra note 12.
Id.
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disclosure under which the risk of the funds cannot be monitored as
necessary. 61
2. Strategic Holdings
The rise of SWFs has triggered concern over “state capitalism.” 62 By
investing heavily in U.S. companies, foreign governments can use SWFs to
seize control of companies in sensitive sectors to promote their own
political agenda and threaten U.S. national security. 63 Strategic areas
include financial services, defense, energy, and telecommunications. 64
According to Dealogic, a financial data provider, SWFs invested $37.9
billion in U.S. financial institutions in 2007, 63% of total SWF activity.65
Investment in financial services offers potential access to technology and
expertise unavailable abroad that can be transferred home. 66 There are
misgivings about sovereign stakes in U.S. banks given Asian countries’
interest in developing their domestic financial markets. 67 Alex Pollock of
the American Enterprise Institute stated in 2008 that SWFs were “arms of
the state,” and that “out-flow of insider knowledge” due to foreign stakes in
U.S. banks should be taken seriously. 68
Defense is another area of investment raising national security
concerns. In early 2006, Dubai Ports World, a company controlled by the
government of Dubai, attempted to acquire Peninsular & Oriental Steam
Navigation Co., a U.K.-based company running global operations in more
than a dozen ports, including six U.S. port facilities. 69 The attempt caused
debates over whether U.S. national security was threatened by the
transaction, and Dubai Ports World, under U.S. pressure, agreed to spin off
the American assets to a purely American company. 70
Acquisitions of large holdings in energy are considered another
potential threat to national security. In 2005, China National Offshore Oil
Cooperation attempted to purchase the U.S. energy company Unocal, which
triggered substantial congressional debates, including debates concerning

61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Andrew Ross Sorkin, What Money Can Buy: Influence, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 22, 2008,

available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/22/business/22sorkin.html?dlbk.
64. Richard Portes, Sovereign Wealth Funds, VOXEU, Oct. 17, 2007, available at
http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/636. See also David Rothnie, Sovereign Wealth
Spending on Banks Exceeds $50bn, FIN. NEWS ONLINE, Jan. 14, 2008, http://www.financialnewsus.com/?page=ushome&contentid=2449561453.
65. Rothnie, supra note 64.
66. See Investments, supra note 22.
67. Cole, supra note 2.
68. Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6.
69. See Greg Hitt, Lawmakers Keep Up Pressure on Dubai Ports Firm, WALL ST. J., Mar. 16,
2006, at A4.
70. Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6.
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China’s possible intention to secure access to natural resources, causing
China to abandon the deal. 71
Telecommunication is also an area raising national security issues.
Foreign ownership in telecommunications is regarded as a threat to the
dilution of culturally significant content in broadcasting. 72
3. Threat to Market Stability
SWF activities have sparked concerns that large foreign holdings of
U.S. securities increase the risk of a financial crisis as a result of potential
large-scale liquidation or portfolio adjustments for economic or noneconomic reasons. 73 Some believe that if a withdrawal of foreign funds
occurs during a period when the domestic economy is growing slowly, the
impact of such withdrawal will be damaging. 74 The Federal Reserve
typically reduces interest rates to stimulate the economy. However, if
outflows of needed capital occurred in an economic recession, it would
force the Federal Reserve to raise interest rates to attract capital inflows.75
Elevated rates would lead some companies to reduce borrowing and
investing. They would also discourage household consumption, especially
of interest-sensitive products such as housing and automobiles. 76 Over the
long run, persistently lower levels of investment and consumption would
impact the growth rate of the economy. 77
Another concern relating to market security is the uncertain risk of
hybrid instruments that have been used in SWFs. 78 A hybrid instrument
generally refers to a financial vehicle that blends characteristics of debt and
equity markets. 79 An example of a hybrid instrument is a convertible
bond. 80 For the purpose of the Bank Holding Company Act (the Act), 81 a
hybrid instrument is classified as debt. 82 Since investment in debt generally
does not give a lender voting rights or control over a company, the
controlling ownership threshold applied to a foreign investor’s equity

71. Edmund L. Andrews, A Furor Was Built on Many Grudges, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 3, 2005,
available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/08/03/business/03react.html.
72. JEFFREY ROBERTSON, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP IN THE TELECOMMUNICATIONS SECTOR,
PARLIAMENT OF AUSTRALIA http://www.aph.gov.au/Library/pubs/RN/2004-05/05rn34.htm.
73. JAMES K. JACKSON, U.S. CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE. FOREIGN OWNERSHIP OF
U.S. FINANCIAL ASSETS: IMPLICATIONS OF A WITHDRAWAL (RL34319; Jan. 14, 2008).
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Cole, supra note 2.
79. What Does Hybrid Security Mean?, Investopedia, a Forbes Digital Company,
http://www.investopedia.com/terms/h/hybridsecurity.asp.
80. Id.
81. 12 U.S.C. § 1841 (2006).
82. Cole, supra note 2.
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holding under the Act does not apply to its investment in debt. 83
Accordingly, as long as SWF investments represent less than ten percent of
the bank or bank holding company’s voting shares, they will escape
scrutiny under the Act even though SWFs also hold hybrids. 84 Some have
expressed concern that sovereign funds may try to boost their stake in U.S.
companies by investing in the form of hybrids. 85
4. Conflicts of Interest
Conflicts of interest are also a concern for SWFs. They commonly arise
when a government is both the regulator and the regulated. 86 Christopher
Cox, former chairman of the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission
(SEC), has raised concern over conflicts of interest in SWFs. 87 According to
Cox, because foreign governments control SWFs, SWFs may not be fully
cooperative in the SEC’s investigation of cases where a government-backed
issuer is suspected of violating U.S. securities laws, which may jeopardize
investors’ interests and the SEC’s mission of protecting investor and market
integrity. 88
B. CONCERNS ABOUT SWFS ARE UNTENABLE
Foreign investments have existed in the U.S. market for a long time, 89
but there is no empirical data showing that they are or have been used to
engage in market manipulation or to serve as a political vehicle to force the
United States to compromise its national security. 90 Although the historical
record may not determine the future course of SWF activities, it potentially
demonstrates the true nature of the funds. Also, other than for commercial
reasons, it is difficult to imagine what types of events could trigger a
withdrawal of SWFs from U.S. financial markets. 91 Further, even if they
83. Id.
84. Id. See also 12 U.S.C. § 1841(a)(2) (2006). The Act requires any company to obtain

approval from the Federal Reserve before making a direct or indirect investment in a U.S. bank or
bank holding company if the investment meets certain thresholds. In particular, the Act defines
that the control interest is acquired when: (1) ownership or control of 25 percent or more of any
class of voting securities of the bank or bank holding company, (2) control of the election of a
majority of the board of directors of the bank or bank holding company, or (3) the ability to
exercise a controlling influence over the management or policies of the bank or bank holding
company.
85. Cole, supra note 2.
86. Christopher Cox, Former Chairman, Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, Speech by SEC Chairman:
The Rise of Sovereign Business, Gauer Distinguished Lecture in Law and Policy at the American
Enterprise Institute Legal Center for the Public Interest (Dec. 5, 2007), available at
http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch120507cc.htm.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. James Surowiecki, Sovereign Wealth World, THE NEW YORKER, Nov. 26, 2007, available
at http://www.newyorker.com/talk/financial/2007/11/26/071126ta_talk_surowiecki.
90. See Asset-backed Insecurity, supra note 8.
91. Jackson, supra note 73.
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continue growing at the current rates, SWFs will remain a small portion of
the world economy, and can hardly disrupt it in a significant manner. 92 In
today’s globally interdependent market, collective manipulation of large
funds, such as a sudden withdrawal of the funds from the U.S. market, is
more likely to harm foreign investors than to harm the U.S. economy as a
whole. 93 Other mechanisms help prevent SWF mischief, including market
competition, 94 the passivity of SWFs, 95 and SWF owners’ increased
awareness of financial practices. Therefore, many concerns and
speculations about SWF harm are unfounded.
1. SWFs Constitute a Small Portion of the World Economy
Although they grow rapidly, with an estimated $2.5 trillion in total
assets, SWFs are worth “much less than the $16 trillion, $18 trillion and
$22 trillion managed by insurance companies, pension funds and mutual
funds, respectively.” 96 In fact, total SWF assets make up only 2% of the
world’s $165 trillion in traded securities. 97 Even if SWFs maintain their
growth rate and reach $12 trillion by 2015, the funds will still account for
less than 3% of global traded securities. 98
The following statistics also illuminate the size of SWF assets. First,
combined SWF assets are a small fraction of the $14 trillion U.S.
economy. 99 Second, the U.S. economy is larger than the next four largest
economies combined—those of Japan, Germany, Britain and China. 100
Finally, Russia’s economy is about the size of New York’s and Arizona’s
combined, and India’s economy is about half the size of California’s. 101
2. Collective Maneuvering of Funds Will Harm Foreign
Investors Themselves
If foreign investors with large holdings attempt to collectively
maneuver their funds to threaten U.S. markets, they will likely either
liquidate U.S. Treasury securities rapidly, or shift the composition of their
portfolios. 102 These activities, however, will be more likely to cause damage
to the investors themselves than to the U.S. economy because of the

92. Will, supra note 30.
93. Adam Davidson, Morning Edition: U.S. Watches Nervously as Oil-Rich Nations Invest,

(Nat’l Public Radio broadcast, Nov. 30, 2007).
94. Surowiecki, supra note 88.
95. Cole, supra note 2.
96. Will, supra note 30.
97. See Asset-backed Insecurity, supra note 8.
98. Id.
99. Will, supra note 30.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Jackson, supra note 73.
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interdependent nature of the global market and the market’s capability for
self-adjustment. 103
If foreign investors attempt to liquidate their U.S. securities rapidly,
they will likely experience a severe loss for two reasons. First, their attempt
to sell quickly will create a huge supply of securities in the market, which
will reduce their gains from liquidation. 104 Second, their attempt to
transform their dollar holdings into other currencies will create large
demand for other currencies, which will drive up their investment
outlays. 105 Given these losses, foreign investors seem unlikely to engage in
coordinated large-scale liquidation.
Further, the impact of such liquidation on the U.S. economy will likely
be minimal because other investors will arbitrage these transactions for their
benefit. 106 In the face of a large-scale liquidation of dollar-denominated
assets, new investors may well consider these assets undervalued and,
accordingly, liquidate or leverage their now higher-priced foreign securities
and use the proceeds to acquire dollar-denominated assets, thereby
replacing those selling U.S. securities. 107 Given the dynamic nature of
capital markets and the instant communication of information, the adverse
effects on the U.S. economy due to such a large-scale liquidation, including
the reduced price of Treasury securities and increased interest rates, should
be “short-lived.” 108
Another strategy that foreign investors could take, with an aim to
adversely affect the U.S. markets, is a shift in the make-up of their
portfolios. 109 Yet, the adjustment of portfolio composition is by no means a
new phenomenon—investors have always engaged in it while reassessing
their investment risks and regulators’ policies. 110 If foreign investors seek to
diversify the composition of their portfolios among dollar-denominated
assets, the exchange value of the dollar will not be affected because the total
demand for dollar-denominated assets will remain constant. 111 If foreign
investors shift their large holdings away from U.S. securities to other
currency-denominated assets, the shift of supply and demand in the
securities market will settle at prices that will be close to those that existed
prior to the original shift by foreign investors. 112 U.S. multinational firms
will take advantage of the shift made by foreign investors, using highervalued foreign currency to repatriate part of the profits of their foreign
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Jackson, supra note 73.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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affiliates, thereby boosting the balance sheet of their U.S. headquarters and
strengthening investments within the United States. 113
In the “context of mutual dependence, [b]lowing somebody else up
does you at least as much financial damage.” 114 Because an interdependent
relationship exists among the global market participants and the market has
strong capability for self-adjustment, a large-scale maneuver of funds by
foreign investors will likely not produce as much damage to the U.S.
economy as it will to foreign investors themselves. Consequently, foreign
investors are likely to refrain from such self-damaging business activities.
3. Investing with Non-commercial Incentives is Self-defeating
Among the concerns about SWFs is the possibility that they will be
invested with non-commercial motives. However, “[r]unning a business
non-commercially is a recipe for huge losses rather than world
domination,” 115 and will be avoided by any rational investor. Free markets
and competition have the capability to correct distorted motives. 116 An
example helps illustrate this point: if a country experienced bad publicity
for its defective products and had its SWF buy an American toy company to
let the company sell toys made in the SWF country, the company would
lose customers quickly to its competitors. 117 Therefore, even if foreign
investors invested with governmental instead of commercial interests, the
market would likely respond accordingly by driving the investor out of the
market. “Free markets don’t require that everyone try to maximize profits;
they just need competition, so that if a company makes bad decisions
someone else can come in and take advantage.” 118 Accordingly, investing
with non-commercial intentions is not a rational choice for investors,
including SWF owners. As long as competition is present in the market, a
company that acts out of non-commercial motives will act at its own peril.
SWF owners should be aware of this and refrain from investing noncommercially.
4. Dangers of Hybrid Securities are Overstated
U.S. banks have raised much capital from SWFs in the form of hybrid
securities. 119 Because hybrids are classified as debt instead of equity, there
is concern that sovereign funds can increase their stake without hitting the

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.

Id.
Davidson, supra note 92.
See Asset-backed Insecurity, supra note 8.
See Davidson, supra note 92; Surowiecki, supra note 88.
Surowiecki, supra note 88.
Id.
Cole, supra note 2.
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controlling ownership threshold under the Bank Holding Company Act.120
However, the danger is overstated because hybrid securities do not have the
voting rights that straight equity has. 121 Further, sovereign funds have
chosen not to take board seats, thereby keeping their investments passive. 122
Arguably, foreign investors could gain some influence over a bank if it
were to become insolvent, because hybrid securities, although subordinated
debt, would nevertheless give investors some claim on a bank’s assets.
However, no one, including issuers and investors, would want the bank to
go bankrupt. The claim at liquidation only gives investors limited influence,
if any. 123
5. Concern over the Outflow of Financial Knowledge is
Unnecessary
Another concern over SWF activities arises from the ambition of SWF
holders to develop their own financial markets. For example, China and
Singapore have expressed their interest in using investments in overseas
financial institutions to acquire money-management knowledge to help
develop their domestic capital markets. 124 Such an agenda is “benign,”
however. 125 It is inevitable that an investor with large holdings will gain
financial knowledge. Indeed, it is difficult to imagine that a market
participant with money at stake will be indifferent toward financial
knowledge. U.S. financial and legal systems have actually encouraged
investors’ research to gain market information and sophistication. 126 The
federal securities laws are derived from one simple and straightforward
concept: disclosure. 127 All investors, whether large institutions or private
individuals, should have access to information about an investment prior to
buying it and while holding it. 128
Further, it does not seem possible to preclude foreign investors from
seeking various paths to financial knowledge. In addition to learning from
investing, knowledge can be obtained by other ways, such as the flow of
human capital. The CIC, for example, has attempted to recruit financial

120. Id. (stating foreign investors that own more than 9.9% of a U.S. bank must demonstrate
that they forgo control of the institution in order to avoid greater scrutiny).
121. Id.
122. Id.
123. Id.
124. Weiss, supra note 12.
125. Id.
126. Press Release, FINRA Investor Education Foundation Funds Research to Improve
Disclosure of Financial Product Information, Financial Industry Regulatory Authority,
http://www.finra.org/Newsroom/NewsReleases/2007/P037228.
127. Lori J. Schock, Speech by SEC Staff: Feedback from Individual Investors on Disclosure
(Jan. 19, 2007), http://www.sec.gov/news/speech/2007/spch011907ljs.htm.
128. Id.
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talent from around the globe since it was founded in 2007. 129 The CIC is
now in negotiations with many experts, including Alan Greenspan, in the
hope that these experts will help the CIC determine global investment
strategies and policies. 130 Finally, an effort to learn good financial practices
should be a good sign that foreign investors are focused on the bottom
line—maximizing returns on their investments.
Given the instant flow of information enabled by advanced technology
and the free movement of human capital, learning from investments in
overseas financial institutions is unavoidable in a global market. Moreover,
gaining financial knowledge should help foreign investors appreciate the
importance of complying with financial rules, which will give them a
foundation to become responsible and credible market participants.
Obtaining financial knowledge will also help foreign investors find
common terms in which they can effectively communicate with other
market participants. This is extremely important because addressing SWF
concerns requires not only an effort from countries receiving SWF
investments, but also input from the foreign investors holding SWFs.
Consequently, concern over the outflow of financial knowledge is
unnecessary.
C. SWFS BENEFIT U.S. AND GLOBAL ECONOMIES
Although recent SWF activities have raised a variety of concerns,
including their possible function as an instrument to achieve sovereign
rather than commercial goals and possible large-scale withdrawal of funds
from U.S. market, the concerns are clearly overstated. In fact, a review of
the history of foreign investment shows that SWFs should bring benefits to
U.S. and global economies.
1. Foreign Investments Benefit the General Economy
Foreign investment is a vital force for creating employment and
innovation. 131 Foreign-owned companies employ approximately one in
twenty American workers. 132 These jobs on average pay thirty percent
higher than the national median for their respective industries. 133 Foreign
investment also benefits the U.S. economy by increasing real estate value,
preserving agricultural land, and promoting venture capital. 134 It led to
129. Zhong tou song chu gan lan zhi, ni pin Gelinsipan ren gu wen [China Investment
Corporation
Inviting
Greenspan
as
its
Advisor],
CHINA
REV.
NEWS,
http://gb.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1005/3/7/0/100537034.html?coluid=10&kindid=253&docid=
100537034&mdate=0107120134.
130. Id.
131. Stagg, supra note 9.
132. The Don’t Invest in America Act, WALL ST. J., July 19, 2006, at A12.
133. Id.
134. See Robert Shearer, The Exon-Florio Amendment: Protectionist Legislation Susceptible to
Abuse, 30 HOUS. L. REV. 1729, 1751 (1993).
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exportation of goods worth over $150 billion in 2003, helping combat the
U.S. trade deficit. 135 It is also an important factor to which economists
attribute vigorous U.S. economic growth. 136 In Canada, parliamentary data
has shown that foreign investment restrictions effectively impede
innovation and expansion of the Canadian economy. 137 As a result, the
Canadian government has commenced proceedings to lift restrictions on
foreign investment. 138
In the United States, capital inflows lower interest rates and increase
access to capital for American enterprise. 139 Without such capital, U.S.
consumers would have to pay higher rates for home mortgages and car
loans than when the capital is available. 140 These foreign capital inflows
thus allow consumer expenditures to exceed the country’s current level of
output of goods and services. 141 Absent such capital, businesses would have
to finance purchases at high rates, which would increase business costs,
pushing up prices and affecting consumers’ standard of living. 142 Presently,
foreign investment is critical because the United States faces both a
historically “high national budget deficit and historically low levels of
public savings.” 143 Consequently, foreign capital benefits the economy and
is needed in this country.
2. SWFs Play a Bridging-gap Role in U.S. Capital Markets
In an open market, capital flows to where it can be used most
efficiently. 144 This argument is corroborated by an economic analysis of
Federal Reserve data during the years from 1996 and 2006. The analysis
shows the interplay among household (individual) savings, the extent of
deficit or surplus of governments, and foreign capital flows. 145 When there
was a lack of household savings and a government surplus, investment was
filled with large capital inflows. 146 In contrast, when there were sufficient
domestic sources of funds, foreign capital fell and flowed out of the
country. 147 Thus, foreign capital rises as a response to the lack of domestic
sources of funds, thereby bridging the gap between the supply and demand
for credit within the U.S. market. Capital inflows increased sharply from
135.
136.
137.
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

Stagg, supra note 9, at 331.
Id.
Robertson, supra note 72.
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See Asset-backed Insecurity, supra note 8.
Shearer, supra note 133, at 1751.
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2000 to 2006, as the United States experienced historically large household
dissaving and historically large governmental deficits in nominal terms.148
Accordingly, SWFs flowed to the U.S. market as a response to the credit
crunch, and the gap-bridging role it plays will support the country’s
continuing economic development. 149
3. SWFs Should Be a Stabilizing Force in Riskier Markets
Empirical data show that SWFs tend to be stabilizers, rather than
disrupters. 150 Because SWFs are used to save for future generations or to
stabilize domestic economies, they typically have a long-term horizon,
avoiding rapid liquidations during market volatility. 151 Moreover, SWFs
tend not to be highly leveraged, which makes them a strong force for
stability. 152 As SWF assets are increasingly allocated to riskier securities, 153
they should be a stabilizing force for riskier financial markets. 154 In its
December 2007 Financial Stability Review, the European Central Bank
wrote:
[SWFs] contribute to the broadening of the long-term investor base for
risky assets, such as equities, corporate bonds, emerging market assets,
private equity and real estate. In this regard, such funds could become a
more stable investor base for risky assets in certain markets. In addition,
provided that the investments of such funds are driven entirely by risk and
return considerations, SWFs may contribute to a more efficient allocation
and diversification of risk at the global level. 155

The stabilizing role of foreign capital can be seen by a comparative
analysis of the U.S. economy during two time periods: November 1982
through December 2007, and 1945 through 1982. 156 In the former period,
large overseas capital was available and the economy was in recession only
4.6 percent of the time. 157 In contrast, during the latter time frame, foreign
capital was generally unavailable, and recession accounted for 22.4 percent

148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.

Id.
Id.
See Asset-backed Insecurity, supra note 8.
Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6. See also Jen, supra note 11.
Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6.
See Steffen Kern, Sovereign Wealth Funds-State Investments on the Rise, DEUTSCHE
BANK RES., Sept. 10, 2007 (discussing that Deutsche Bank estimates a total of over $1 trillion
from SWFs will flow into global equity markets and $1.5 trillion into global debt markets over the
next five years); Alex Patelis, The Overflowing Bathtub, the Running Tap and SWFs, MERRILL
LYNCH ECON. ANALYSIS, Oct. 6, 2007 (on the more aggressive assumption, Merrill Lynch
projects that $3.1 to $6 trillion will be invested in riskier assets by SWFs in the next five years).
154. Will, supra note 30.
155. EUROPEAN CENTRAL BANK, FINANCIAL STABILITY REVIEW Dec. 2007,
http://www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/other/financialstabilityreview200712en.pdf.
156. Will, supra note 30.
157. Id.
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of the time. 158 Consequently, the inflow of foreign funds has played a role
in stabilizing the economy. Because SWFs help stabilize the investor base
for riskier markets across national borders, they are likely to contribute to a
more rational allocation of risk at the global level. 159 As a result, the debate
continues as to whether SWFs can be used as part of the efforts to tackle the
current financial crisis. 160
IV. U.S. RESPONSES TO SWF INVESTMENTS AND
REGULATIONS
Opinions about SWFs within the United States are split. While there
has been fear that SWFs are going to buy up America and threaten U.S.
national security, 161 many economists take the view that “money is
naturally going to gravitate toward dollar-based assets because of the
strength of our economy.” 162 The strengths of the U.S economy include a
well-developed financial system, large market size, strong per-capita buying
power, advanced transportation and communication facilities, 163 as well as a
favorable regulatory scheme, overall economic stability, and political
stability with regard to trade policy. 164 These factors have contributed to the
rise in foreign investment. 165
A. U.S. POLICY AND REGULATIONS WITH REGARD TO FOREIGN
INVESTMENT
U.S. government leaders have traditionally advocated an open foreigninvestment policy. 166 President Reagan is particularly credited for shaping
modern U.S. policy in this area. After the end of the Cold War, with the
resulting global environment amenable to international trade, President
Reagan encouraged foreign investment in the United States by highlighting
the benefits the country provides to foreign investors. 167 This policy led to
an unprecedented level of foreign capital imported into the United States

158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Jim Moran, Paving the Way for Sovereign Wealth, NAT’L J., Dec. 10, 2008,

http://www.nationaljournal.com/njonline/no_20081210_7663.php.
161. Steven R. Weisman, Concern about Sovereign Wealth Funds Spreads to Washington,
INT’L HERALD TRIB., Aug. 20, 2007. See also David R. Francis, Will Sovereign Wealth Funds
Rule the World?, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR, Nov. 26, 2007, at 16, available at
http://www.csmonitor.com/2007/1126/p16s01-wmgn.html (SWFs are “huge, scarily big”);
Surowiecki, supra note 88.
162. Weisman, supra note 160.
163. Stagg, supra note 9, at 330–31.
164. Michael Petrusic, Recent Development, Oil and the National Security: CNOOC’s Failed
Bid to Purchase Unocal, 84 N.C.L. REV. 1373, 1387 (2006).
165. Stagg, supra note 9, at 330–31.
166. Shearer, supra note 133, at 1746–47.
167. Id. at 1747.
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and vigorous domestic economic growth. 168 The United States won “the
global race for capital.” 169 As a result of its liberal policy toward foreign
investment, the United States led a modern revolution toward globalization
and the free movement of capital, promoting its status as the leader in
advancing democratic and capitalist ideologies. 170 The United States
continues to encourage other nations to reduce investment barriers through
participation in multilateral negotiations such as the Uruguay Round of
trade negotiations and the North American Free Trade Agreement
(NAFTA). 171
Because of its policies favoring open investment, U.S. regulation of
foreign investment was relaxed except in extreme cases. 172 The Committee
on Foreign Investment in the United States (CFIUS) 173 characterizes U.S.
policy toward foreign investment as follows:
The United States has traditionally welcomed Foreign Direct Investment
(FDI) and provided foreign investors fair, equitable and nondiscriminatory
treatment with few limited exceptions designed to protect national
security. [U.S. regulations with regard to foreign investment are] . . .
implemented within the context of this open investment policy. 174

In 1977, the first statute to regulate foreign investment, the International
Economic Emergency Powers Act, was passed. 175 The statute authorized
the president to block transactions involving property of hostile
governments or their citizens. 176 However, presidents were reluctant to
invoke it because doing so would be close to “a declaration of hostilities
against the government of the acquirer company.” 177
168. Christopher R. Fenton, U.S. Policy Towards Foreign Direct Investment Post-September
11: Exon-Florio in the Age of Transnational Security, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 195, 197
(2002).
169. See The Don’t Invest in America Act, supra note 131.
170. Fenton, supra note 167, at 196.
171. Shearer, supra note 133, at 1748.
172. Stagg, supra note 9, at 338.
173. U.S. Dep’t of Treasury, Committee on Foreign Investments in the United States,
http://www.ustreas.gov/offices/international-affairs/exon-florio/. The CFIUS, an inter-agency
committee chaired by the secretary of the Treasury, is designated by the president to implement
the Exon-Florio provision, investigating foreign-investment transactions that raise national
security concerns. CFIUS was originally established by Executive Order 11858 in 1975 mainly to
monitor and evaluate the impact of foreign investment in the United States. In 1988, the president,
pursuant to Executive Order 12661, delegated to CFIUS his responsibilities under Section 721.
Specifically, E.O. 12661 designated CFIUS to receive notices of foreign acquisitions of U.S.
companies, to determine whether a particular acquisition has national security issues sufficient to
warrant an investigation and to undertake an investigation, if necessary, under the Exon-Florio
provision. This order also provides for CFIUS to submit a report and recommendation to the
president at the conclusion of an investigation. For CFIUS review procedure in implementing the
Exon-Florio provision, see next section. See id.
174. Id.
175. Stagg, supra note 9.
176. See 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701(a), 1702(a)(1)(B) (2000).
177. Fenton, supra note 167, at 203.
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In 1988, the Exon-Florio provision of the Omnibus Trade and
Competitiveness Act was passed as a response to the attempted acquisition
of Fairchild Semiconductor Corporation, an American company, by the
Fujitsu Corporation, a Japanese company. 178 U.S. government officials
viewed the deal as threatening national security because they believed that
Japanese companies intended to dominate the world semiconductor
market. 179 The Exon-Florio provision allowed the president to block
transactions or divest foreign interests in U.S. companies that constituted
threats to national security. 180
In 1993, Congress expanded the Exon-Florio provision through the
National Defense Authorization Act, known as the Byrd Amendment. 181
Under the Byrd Amendment, the factors to be considered by CFIUS in
determining whether a proposed transaction by a foreign entity is legitimate
emphasize the national security implications of the foreign acquisitions.182
The Byrd Amendment makes investigation of transactions by executive
branches and offices mandatory when two conditions are met: when (1) the
acquirer is “controlled by or acting on behalf of a foreign government,” and
(2) the acquisition “could result in control of a person engaged in interstate
commerce in the United States that could affect the national security of the
United States.” 183
The CFIUS regulations have triggered critiques because the definitions
of key terms in the regulations are ambiguous. 184 First, the definition of
“control” is not a bright line rule like the majority ownership standard; 185
178.
179.
180.
181.

Shearer, supra note 133, at 1730.
Id.
See 50 App. U.S.C.A. § 2170(d)(1) & (3).
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993, Pub. L. No. 102-484, § 837(a),
106 Stat. 2315, 2463 (1993).
182. According to 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(f)(8):
For purposes of this section, the President or the President’s designee may,
taking into account the requirements of national security, consider: (1)
domestic production needed for projected national defense requirements, (2)
the capability and capacity of domestic industries to meet national defense
requirements, including the availability of human resources, products,
technology, materials, and other supplies and services, (3) the control of
domestic industries and commercial activity by foreign citizens as it affects
the capability and capacity of the United States to meet the requirements of
national security, (4) the potential effects of the proposed or pending
transaction on sales of military goods, equipment, or technology to any
country . . .
See 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(f)(8).
183. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1993 Pub. L. No. 102-484, §837(a)(2),
106 Stat. 2315, 2463 (1993).
184. See Christopher F. Corr, A Survey of the United States Controls on Foreign Investment and
Operations: How Much Is Enough?, 9 AM. U. J. INT’L L. & POL’Y 417, 429–30 (1994).
185. Steen Thomsen and Torben Pedersen, Industry and Ownership Structure, 18 INT’L REV. L.
& ECON. 385, 391. The majority ownership is ownership of a sufficient number of a corporation’s
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instead, CFIUS looks to the functional abilities of an acquirer to exercise
control. 186 The regulations provide that there is no control when voting
securities are held “solely for the purpose of passive investment,” which
means that the acquirer “does not plan or intend to exercise control . . . .” 187
The definition seems to be circular. The Exon-Florio provision has also
been criticized because “national security” is not defined under the statute;
rather, executive departments and offices have broad authority to determine
on a case-by-case basis whether a transaction poses a threat to national
security. 188 Because the national security standard is “a broad, vague
generality” subject to “numerous inconsistent interpretations,” 189 fear has
arisen that foreign investors will seek other markets with less ambiguous
regulatory standards. 190
However, presidential action under the provision has been minimal. In
the period between 1988 and 1999, the president investigated only
seventeen of more than 1,200 companies that volunteered for review. 191 Of
those investigated, seven withdrew their offers, and the president declined
to pursue nine of the remaining ten cases. 192 Until recently, CFIUS, with
executive-authorized power to investigate foreign investment, applied a
fairly narrow interpretation of the Exon-Florio provision. 193 In applying the
statute, CFIUS seems to have focused on balancing multilayered policy
considerations, “seek[ing] to serve U.S. investment policy through thorough
reviews that protect national security while maintaining the credibility of
our open investment policy and preserving the confidence of foreign
investors here and of U.S. investors abroad that they will not be subject to
retaliatory discrimination.” 194

voting shares to control company policy. This may be more than 50% or less, if the other shares
are widely dispersed and not actively vote. Id.
186. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.204. See also Gilson, Ronald J. and Milhaupt, Curtis J., Sovereign
Wealth Funds and Corporate Governance: A Minimalist Response to the New Merchantilism,
Feb. 18, 2008, Columbia Law and Economics Working Paper No. 328,
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1095023. The proposed regulations defined control functionally, in terms
of the ability of the acquirer to make certain important decisions about the acquired company,
such as whether to dissolve the entity, or to relocate or close production or research and
development facilities. A number of commenters complained that this standard is too nebulous,
and advocated the adoption of a bright line control test based on a particular percentage of stock
ownership and/or the composition of the board of directors. Given the national security purposes
underlying section 721, the CFIUS believes it would be inappropriate to adopt such bright line
tests, which would make it relatively easy to structure transactions to circumvent the statute. See
id.
187. See 31 C.F.R. § 800.223, 31 C.F.R. §800.302(b).
188. Corr, supra note 183.
189. Shearer, supra note 133, at 1741–42.
190. Corr, supra note 183, at 421.
191. Fenton, supra note 167, at 210.
192. Id.
193. Id. at 211.
194. U.S. Department of Treasury, supra note 172.
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In addition to Exon-Florio, which targets foreign investments that
implicate national security, other laws are in place that restrict the
percentage of foreign ownership in sensitive sectors, which include
aviation, defense, banking, electric and gas, mineral leases and resources,
power generation and utility services, real estate, and communications and
broadcasting. 195 Under the Bank Holding Act, for example, foreign
investors must own less than twenty-five percent of a U.S. bank to avoid
increased scrutiny. 196 Aside from setting limits for the percentage of foreign
ownership, statutes also look to the nationality of the owners or the
management, in order to determine whether a U.S. subsidiary is used by
foreign investors for their investment. 197
B. NEW DEVELOPMENT: FINSA
FINSA, a recent amendment to Exon-Florio, greatly affects SWF
investment in the United States. 198 Its enactment was a consequence of
substantial controversy surrounding the attempted acquisition of six major
U.S. shipping ports by Dubai Ports World in 2006. 199 The planned
transaction generated intense political debates and heightened interest in
national security issues arising from foreign acquisitions of U.S.-based
entities. 200 In July 2007, Congress passed FINSA, aimed at reforming the
Exon-Florio review process for foreign investment in U.S. entities. 201 While
retaining the basic components of the CFIUS review procedures, FINSA
mandates more rigorous procedures, including expanding the definition of
industries that fall under the category to be reviewed by CFIUS, increasing
post-closing scrutiny for previously reviewed and cleared transactions, and
enhancing the executive and Congressional involvement in the scrutiny of
overseas investments, especially that made by a foreign government. As a
result, foreign entities investing in the United States are challenged by
tougher regulatory treatment.
FINSA makes clear that foreign investments subject to national security
review go well beyond those in the traditional defense sectors to include
investments in “critical infrastructure.” 202 Under FINSA, critical
infrastructure is defined expansively as any “systems and assets, whether
physical or virtual, so vital to the United States that the incapacity or
destruction of such systems or assets would have a debilitating impact on
national security.” 203 The definition of critical infrastructure permits more
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.
200.
201.
202.
203.

Corr, supra note 183.
See discussion, supra note 83.
See Corr, supra note 183.
Foreign Investment and Nationality Security Act of 2007, PL 110-49, 121 Stat. 246.
See The Don’t Invest in America Act, supra note 131.
Id.
Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6.
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(b)(2)(B)(i)(III).
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(a)(6).
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industries to be included for CFIUS review, such as energy assets. Although
the statute does not define energy assets, its legislative history implies that
Congress expects CFIUS to interpret this term broadly to include electrical
generating, transmission and distribution facilities, gas storage,
transmission, and distribution facilities. 204 The scope of national security is
also expanded to include matters of homeland security. 205
FINSA provides explicit statutory authority for CFIUS to “negotiate,
enter into or impose, and enforce any agreement or condition with any party
to the covered transaction in order to mitigate any threat to the national
security of the United States that arises as a result of the covered
transaction.” 206 Accordingly, CFIUS is statutorily empowered with the
authority to require changes to a deal via a “mitigation agreement” in
exchange for CFIUS approval. Further, CFIUS has the power to designate a
lead agency to negotiate mitigation agreements. 207 FINSA requires the lead
agency to report periodically to CFIUS on the parties’ compliance with the
agreed conditions and to report any material change in connection with a
transaction. 208
FINSA also requires greater scrutiny by CFIUS far beyond the business
transaction itself. Under FINSA, where a foreign government-owned entity
is involved, CFIUS must consider whether the foreign government is in
compliance with U.S. and multilateral counter-terrorism, non-proliferation
and export control regimes. 209 As a result, factors that are not necessarily
related to the transaction in question come under CFIUS scrutiny, which
increases the uncertainty of doing business.
Congressional involvement in overseas investment is also enhanced by
a mechanism established under FINSA where member agencies must meet
in a commission and ask questions probing the risks associated with a
transaction, both in terms of the threat to national security posed by the
foreign investor, and the vulnerabilities of the asset or entity that is being
acquired. 210 These member agencies include: Homeland Security,
Commerce, Defense, State, the Attorney General, Energy (a new addition),
and the Treasury, whose secretary sits as the chair. 211 The secretary of
Labor and the Director of National Intelligence act as non-voting

204. Skadden, Arps, Slate, Meagher & Flom LLP & Affiliates, President Signs Legislation
Reforming U.S. National Security Reviews of Foreign Investments in U.S. Companies, Wash.,
D.C., July 26, 2007, at n.1, www.skadden.com/content%5CPublications%5CPublications1292
_0.pdf.
205. Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6.
206. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(l)(1)(A) (2009).
207. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(k)(5); see also Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6.
208. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(k)(5); see also Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6.
209. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(f)(9).
210. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(g); see also Mullane & Kaul, supra note 6.
211. 50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(k)(2)–(3).
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members. 212 FINSA also grants the president the discretion to appoint
additional representatives from other executive agencies and offices. 213
Further, following the conclusion of a CFIUS review, CFIUS must provide
Congress with notice of the transaction, the actions taken, briefings, and
certifications by CFIUS officials. 214 As a result, FINSA significantly
strengthens Congressional oversight of the review process. Such
transaction-by-transaction Congressional involvement also raises the risk of
political mischief.
Finally, FINSA removes the safe harbor rule, which protected a
previously reviewed and cleared transaction from post-closing scrutiny by
CFIUS. 215 Post-closing scrutiny, which can result in asset divestitures or
potential unwinding, can be invoked upon a finding of intentional omission
or misrepresentation in the original notification to CFIUS, or the party’s
material breach of a mitigation agreement. 216
FINSA represents a unilateral U.S. action to deal with concerns over
SWFs. Because of FINSA, foreign investors can expect an increased risk of
delays, as well as political and bureaucratic inference in the proposed
business transaction. Foreign investors will weigh the increased regulatory
costs in making investment decisions, and will likely shy away from the
U.S. market because of the regulatory uncertainty and political fights that
ensue for larger SWF investments. This will likely affect the
competitiveness of the United States in attracting capital. Therefore, strict
enforcement of the statute is worthwhile only when the risks of SWFs
outweigh their benefits and when there are no alternative ways to mitigate
SWF risks.
V. INTERNATIONAL BEST PRACTICE IS POSSIBLE
In tackling the perceived risks posed by SWFs, the establishment of
international standards for SWF activities provides an attractive alternative
to U.S. unilateral action. The elements that have been suggested for
international standards include transparency, governance, and reciprocity.217
A set of international codes that stress these elements offers a promising
way to increase the accountability of SWF activities. 218

212.
213.
214.
215.
216.
217.

50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(k)(2).
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(k)(6).
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(b)(3).
50 U.S.C.A. app. § 2170(b)(1)(D)(ii)–(iii) (2009).
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http://www.voxeu.org/index.php?q=node/881.
218. Id. See also Edwin M. Truman, Sovereign Wealth Fund Acquisitions and Other Foreign
Government Investments in the United States: Assessing the Economic and National Security
Implications, Testimony before the Committee on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, U.S.
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Because Norway’s fund is universally considered to be transparent and
publicly accountable, it may become a model for other SWFs. 219 Norway’s
fund features detailed and regular disclosure about SWF activities,
accounting and auditing information. 220 The fund is also considered an
accountable investor with non-strategic holdings and “clear lines of
responsibility between political authorities and the operational
management.” 221 In addition, the fund restricts its ownership to five percent
of shares in any company in which it invests. 222
In October 2007, the final G7 statement, while supporting the argument
that the world economies “can benefit from openness to SWF investment
flows,” urged that best practices be identified for SWFs in the areas of
institutional structure, risk management, transparency and accountability.223
The G7 meeting further asked the International Monetary Fund (IMF),
World Bank, and the Organization for Economic Co-operation and
Development (OECD) to examine this area. 224 To prevent financial
protectionism, the IMF also emphasized principles of nondiscrimination,
transparency, and predictability among recipients of SWFs. 225 OECD has
produced guidelines building upon these principles. 226
Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson, on behalf of the U.S., stated
in the International Monetary and Finance Committee of the IMF that the
United States values a multilateral approach that maintains open investment
policies while seeking “[b]est practices [that] would provide multilateral
guidance to new funds on how to make sound decisions, how to structure
themselves, mitigate any potential systemic risk, and help demonstrate to
critics that SWFs can be constructive, responsible participants in the
international financial system.” 227
So far, SWF owners have responded favorably to the IMF’s request for
more disclosure. They are aware of the tensions their activities have raised,
and are “unlikely to exacerbate matters with aggressive acquisitions.” 228 For
example, China and Singapore have expressed their willingness to comply
Senate (Nov. 14, 2007), http://www.petersoninstitute.org/publications/papers/truman1107.pdf
[hereinafter Truman, Testimony].
219. See Transparency and Trust, supra note 50.
220. TRUMAN, A SCOREBOARD, supra note 3.
221. See Transparency and Trust, supra note 50.
222. Id.
223. Treasury Dep’t, Press Release, Statement of G-7 Finance Ministers and Central Bank
Governors, Oct. 19, 2007, http://treas.gov/press/releases/hp625.htm.
224. Id.
225. Id.
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http://www.oecd.org/document/19/0,3343,en_2649_34887_41807059_1_1_1_1,00.html.
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with best practices and increase transparency efforts. 229 In November 2007,
the CIC disclosed that a third of its $200 billion in assets would be used to
buy foreign assets and that the other two-thirds would be invested
domestically. 230 The CIC further disclosed that it would invest mostly in
portfolios rather than individual companies and that it had no intention of
gaining controlling interests in any companies. 231 China maintains that the
CIC will prove to be a responsible corporate citizen, not investing in
industries that damage the environment, waste energy or produce
tobacco. 232 Nor will it buy into overseas airlines, telecommunications or oil
firms. 233 In terms of management, China says that the CIC will have its own
corporate governance structure, without governmental interference. 234 Lou
Jiwei, Chairman of the CIC, has argued that if any country receiving
investments has misgivings, China “may choose to leave” or look
elsewhere. 235 Yet not all SWFs share the same position. According to Tony
Tan, Executive Director of Singapore’s GIC:
We believe there is a case for further disclosure on the part of sovereign
wealth funds in the interest of transparency. Such disclosure can include
clarity on the relationship between the funds and the respective
governments, their investment objectives and general strategies, and their
internal governance and risk management practices . . . . Any guidelines
on sovereign wealth funds should encourage them to operate according to
commercial principles with a long-term orientation, free from political
motivations. Singapore will participate in formulating a set of principles
and best practices for sovereign wealth funds. 236

Transparency of SWF investment has emerged as an issue of paramount
importance. Transparency requires substantial quantitative disclosure about
investment strategies, outcomes, and the nature and location of actual
investments. 237 Transparency further dictates the activities of investment
mechanisms to published, independent audits. 238 Also, those concerned
about unjustified barriers for SWF flow argue that a lack of transparency is
a factor leading to protectionism and a tougher environment for SWF

229. Steven R. Weisman, China Tries to Reassure U.S. About Its Investing Plans, N. Y. TIMES,
Feb. 1, 2008, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2008/02/01/business/worldbusiness/
01sovereign.html. See also Weiss, supra note 12.
230. Keith Bradsher, $200 Billion to Invest, but in China, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 29, 2007, available
at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/29/business/worldbusiness/29yuan.html.
231. Weisman, supra note 228.
232. Id.
233. Bradsher, supra note 229. See also Brad Setser, China’s Sovereign Wealth Fund, RGE
MONITOR, Sept. 24, 2007, http://blogs.cfr.org/setser/2007/09/24/china-s-sovereign-wealth-fund/.
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investment. 239 Therefore, a path that can counter suspicion and
protectionism while meeting the requirements of transparency should be
sought for SWFs. The international guidelines set by the IMF and OECD
will likely contribute to this goal.
The mutual trust and confidence that transparency would establish
should address many of the concerns SWF activities raise. First, an
increased level of transparency will alleviate the negative impact of greater
SWF investment by allowing financial markets to better monitor SWF
activity and exercise market discipline. 240 Second, it serves the interests of
SWF holders in that transparency will help reduce the mysteries and
misunderstandings surrounding SWFs, thereby reducing hostility towards
the funds and resulting in more stable and predictable environment for SWF
activities. 241
Although some observers are concerned that the IMF guidelines are
voluntary and that there is no guarantee of compliance by nations holding
SWFs, compliance should be expected because it serves the interests of
nations receiving SWFs as well as those holding the funds. Moreover, most
nations with SWFs are members of the IMF and are formally committed to
a stable international monetary system. 242 Because mutual benefits will
result from observing international best practices, such standards should be
established and will likely be heeded. Compared to the unilateral, sweeping
regulation of SWFs by the U.S., international standards emphasize
cooperation and build confidence in the international community.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
SWFs have existed for more than half a century. They do not have a
record of political or market mischief. Instead, their history shows that SWF
investment spreads financial capital, helps the world economy adjust to
imbalances, and gives countries stakes in each other’s prosperity.
Regardless, the increasing size and activism in markets of SWFs, together
with their state-controlled nature, have raised suspicions about these funds’
motives. If SWFs remain opaque, it is likely that a number of countries will
increasingly oppose sovereign wealth acquisitions. That opposition will
serve to restrict the investing activities and raise the investment risks for
these funds. In response to the challenges posed by SWFs, the best option
now available is to establish an internationally agreed upon standard to
guide transparency and depress politically-driven investment decisions. The
239. Charlie McGreevey, European Commissioner for Internal Market and Services, The
Importance of Open Markets, Speech before Council of British Chambers of Commerce in
Continental Europe (COBCOE) (Jan. 10, 2008), http://www.edubourse.com/finance/
actualites.php?actu=35306.
240. Weiss, supra note 12.
241. Truman, Testimony, supra note 217, at 9.
242. Weiss, supra note 12.
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guidelines are not only necessary, but also viable, as both recipients and
owners of SWFs see that their interests lie in building confidence.
Open investment policies bring about global prosperity. An open policy
should be espoused without compromising national security and
transparency. It need not lead to protectionist responses, however. Conflicts
over one investment, such as Dubai Port World’s acquisition of U.S. port
facilities, should not be generalized to all SWFs. Such generalizations spark
uncertainty, spilling over into the trade of goods and services and causing
undue damage to the economy. 243 This is especially dangerous during the
current financial crisis. Instead of responding unilaterally with excessive
regulations, the United States should play a leading role in the international
community to establish a set of guidelines for SWF transparency.
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